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Summary:
This paper develops a bioeconomic model for two Barents Sea fisheries that attempts to capture the
predator-prey relationships betwen cod and capelin, the two main species in the habitat. The aim is
to analyse joint (cooperative) versus separate (non-cooperative) management of this predator-prey
system with a view to isolating the effciency loss due to separate management. Using a game
theoretic framework and a multicohort age structured biomodel, we compute joint and separate
management equilibrium outcomes of the model, and investigate the effects of changes in economic
parameters on the computed results. In this way, we explore the economic consequences of the
predator-prey relationships between cod and capelin, and the externalities due to non-cooperation.
Results of the study tend to suggest that (i) under current market conditions it is economically
optimal to exploit both species (rather than just one of them) under joint management, (ii) in
comparison with the separate management outcome, a severe reduction of the capelin fishery is
called for under joint management, and (iii) the loss in discounted economic rent resulting from the
externalities due to the natural interactions between the species is significant, reaching upto almost a
quarter of what is achievable under separate management.
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Introduction
The marine life in the Barents Sea supports two major fisheries, a fishery for cod and other
demersal speeies, and a pur se seine fishery for capelin. It is known that there is a predator-
prey relationship between cod and capelin 1. The purpose of this paper is to study the
economic effects of this biological inter-relationship under different management
arrangements. We develop a model that captures this relationship, thereafter we employ a
numerical method to compute various equilibrium solutions of the modeL. First, Nash non-
cooperative equilbrium solutions are deteriined when the two stoeks are managed
separately by their respective owners. Second, we identify joint management equilibrium
solutions by assuiing that exploitation and management of cod and capelin are carried out
by a sole owner2. The latter solution is best in the sense that the sole owner is expected to
internalise the externalities that are bound to originate from the natural interactions between
the two species. Third, we allow the exploitation of only cod in order to investigate the
econoiic merits of allowing cod to feed on capelin while only cod is harvested for human
consumption. Note that cod is the more valuable of the two species.
Specifically, the main questions with which we are concerned in this paper include: (i)
What is the maximum discounted econoiic rent that can be derived from the resource
under joint and separate management? (ii) How significant is the differenee between these
two solutions? (iii) What is the effect of exploitation on the stock levels under these
1 Eide and Flaaten (1992) gives a compact review of the ecosystem of the Barents sea fisheries.
2 Contrast this with Flaaten and Armstrong (1991), where two variants of the cooperative (joint management)
solution are discussed; one in which transfer payments are allowed and the other in which they are not. The
sole ownership assumption here coincides with the "transfer payment" variant.
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management regimes? (iv) Is it econoiically optimal to exploit both speeies at current
market conditions? and (v) How are capelin harvest and predation traded-off against each
other, given changes in prices, costs, and discount factors?
We begin by giving a short bibliographic note (section 2), then we set up a bioeconomic
model for the cod-capelin fisheries of the Barents Sea in section 3. In section 4, we present
data and the numerical results. The solution procedure for the model is relegated to an
appendix. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Bibliographic note
Quirk and Siith (1970) and Anderson (1975) were among the first theoretical papers to
appear in the fisheries economics literature that study the economics of ecologically
interdependent fisheries. Both of the se papers study and compare the free access
equilbrium and the social optimum in such systems. They derive necessary conditions for
optimum and interpret these in general terms. Hannesson (1983) extends the results of these
two papers by finding answers to the following questions: (i) To what extend are the results
of single-species theory valid also for multi-species theory? (ii) Is there a well-defined
relative price of products obtained at different levels in the food chain at which harvesting
should be switched from one speeies to the others? (iii) Wil a stronger discounting of the
future always imply a decreasing standing stock of biomass?
Three points should be noted about the above-mentioned works. First, none of the papers
analyses strategic conflcts and interactions. Second, as in Silvert and Smith (1977) and
May et aL. (1979), these papers use slightly different versions of the Lotka- V olterra model
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to charaeterise the multi-species systems they study. Hence, the implicit assumption in
these papers is that the fish population is a homogeneous entity that can be adequately
described by a single variable. Third, the papers are mainly theoretical, with very little or no
empirical content, they are hence not applied to any specific fishery.
The fundamental game theoretic paper that analysed the problems associated with the joint
management of fishery resources in detail is Munro (1979). The papers of direct bearing to
this work are those of Fisher and Mirman (1992), and Flaaten and Armstrong (1991). These
are theoretical analyses of interdependent renewable resources, which study game
situations. In addition, these papers assume single cohort growth rules to derive general
theoretical results. By contrast our paper, on one hand, is an empirical study of the Barents
Sea fisheries, which explicitly recognises that fish grow with time and that the age groups
of fish are important both biologically and economically; on the other hand, a central aspect
of this paper is that it studies game situations and applies specific functions to analyse two
specific fisheries. It is worth mentioning that these fisheries have previously been studied
both biologically and economically for the purpose of finding the optimal rate of utilisation
of the resources therein (Eide and Flaaten, 1992, Hamre and Tjelmeland, 1982).
Nevertheless, this study should provide further insights into the problems involved. For
instance, in contrast to this paper, Eide and Flaaten (1992) analyse only the sole ownership
outcome.
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The bioeconomic model
We model a multi-species system in which there are two biologically interdependent
speeies. The interdependency derives from the fact that one of the speeies, that is, cod,
predates the other, capelin. This biological interaction is captured here through the way we
model the weight of cod and the predation on cape lin by cod. The simple assumptions we
make regarding these are (i) the weight of the predator (cod) is positively related to the
density of capelin in the habitat, and (ii) the predation on capelin depends positivelyon the
biomass of cod and the density of capelin in the habitat. It is also likely that the survival
rate of cod wil dep end weakly on the abundance of good food, i.e., capelin. This effect is,
however, considered negligible and thus ignored in this formulation. The formalisation of
these assumptions are based on Moxnes (1992), which in turn is inspired by the
MULTSIMP model developed by Tjelmeland (1990).
Capelin
The capelin fishery takes place in two seasons (the winter and summer fishing seasons ) of
approximately two months duration each. The winter capelin fishery exploits mature
capelin on its way to the spawning grounds. The most important age group exploited by this
fishery is 4, but some 3 and 5 year olds are caught as well. The summer capelin fishery
exploits fish of 2 years and above. In this model, we concentrate the capelin fishery into the
winter season only. The justification for this are threefold. First, the winter fishery is
econoiically the more important of the two. Second, the winter fishery exploits mainly
mature capelin, which are more valuable because they weigh more. Third, caught winter
capelin is more likely to last longer than summer capelin since it normally has less organic
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content in its diet. This is partly because capelin stops feeding before spawning, after which
it dies. We assume all capelin mature at the age of 4 and confine the winter capelin fishery
to age groups 3 and 4. Hence, there are four capelin age groups in our model. At the
opening of a fishing season, a constant number of I-year olds are recruited into the fishery.
For a typical capelin cohort, a decrease in the stock comes from natural mortality,jishing
mortality, and the predatory activities of cod on the cohort.
From now on we use the subscripts a (a=I,..,A) and t (t=I,..,T) to represent age groups of
fish (both capelin and cod) and fishing periods, respectively; and the superscripts co and ca
to refer to variab1es and parameters that relate to cod and capelin, respectively. Note that A
and T denote the last age group and last fishing period, respectively.
Natural survival rate, sea, is assumed to be constant for all age groups. Fishing mortality is
given by the harvest function,
(1) hca = qca ecaait a t
Where the parameter q~a is the age-dependant catchability coefficient; and e;a is the
fishing effort exerted on capelin. We model the harvest function in this manner because
capelin is a schooling species, hence, the assumption is that once capelin schools are
located the fishing vessel is simply filed up in readiness for return to the port of call3.
Following Moxnes (1992), we let the predation on age group a capelin in period t by cod,
p~~, be given by
(2) ca caPa,t = Pina,i
3 Clark and Kirkwood (1979) is one example where a similar formulation of the harvest function is applied.
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where n~~i is the number of age a capelin in period t; p i' denoting relative predation, is
defined as the amount of capelin eaten by cod in period t divided by the total biomass of
capelin in that period. Hence, P~~i is the number of age group a capelin eaten by cod in
period t.
The amount of capelin eaten is a function of both the biomass of the predator, Bpred' and the
density of the prey, D prey 2 O. Furthermore, when D prey, = 1, each cod is assumed to eat ki
times its own weight. Thus, p i can be expressed as
(3)
klDprey Bpred
Pi = i i
B prey i
Figure 1 below ilustrates how relative predation varies with changes in the biomass ratio
(that is, biomass of predator divided by biomass of prey) at different prey densities. It is
seen from equation 3 and Figure 1 that an increase in the biomass ratio results in an
increase in relative predation, while an increase in prey density leads to an upward swing in
the relative predation curve.
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Figure 1: Relative predation \i Biomass ratio at different levels of density
of prey
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Note that when there is no capelin, Dpreyi = O and hence Pt is also zero. The density of
capelin in the habitat at time t, Dprey, ' is defined by the following equation (Moxnes, 1992)
(4) D preyi
Dmaxprey
B
1 + (Dmax -1)(~)-ßprey B
prey
where B prey is a standard magnitude of capelin biomass at which D prey = 1; Di::~ is a
constant maximum factor by which cod wil increase its normal intake of capelin (given by
ki) at high densities of capelin; and ß :; O is a parameter. It is worth mentioning that the
above relationship corresponds to the type 2 functional response reported in Hollng (1965).
We ilustrate in Figure 2 the relationship between density of prey and prey biomass. As can
be seen the curve is concave.
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Figure 2: Oensity \i Biomass of prey
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From the foregoing, the stock dynamics of the capelin stock can be represented by
nca = Rca1,1
ca oe ca ca cani,t - snu_i - Pi,t
(5) ca hea oe ca ca can3,t + 3,t - S ni,t-I - P3,t
ea + h ca o( ca ca ca ca? E 't t ? l' ca .
n4,t 4,t - S n3,t-1 - P4,t n4,t -, -, na,O given .
In the above equation, n~~o denotes the number of age a capelin at the start of the game; Rca
is constant recruitment of capelin; and E represents the escapement required to maintain
recruitment of the stock. This escapement is set equal to half a millon tonnes as
recommended by Hamre and Tjelmeland (1982). The stipulation of a minimum escapement
implies that recruitment of capelin can be regarded as independent of the stock level so long
as escapement do es not occur below this threshold value.
Cad
In this case a typical cohort of cod decreases in number due to only natural and fishing
mortalities. But unlike in the case of capelin where weight of individuals in a given age
group is assumed to be constant, weight of cod is assumed to dep end positivelyon the
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density of capelin, D preyi' The dependenee of the weight of age group a cod in period t on
the density of capelin is captured mathematically by (see Moxnes, 1992):
(6) w~~ = w~~!,-I + GWaO (DpreYiki + (1- ki )), co .wa,o given
where w~oo is the weight of an individual in age group a cod (in kg) at the start of the game;
GWaO is normal growth rate of age group a cod; and ki denotes the relative importanee of
capelin as food for cod in relation to other sources of nutrition. Notice that when there is no
capelin in the habitat, D prey, is equal to zero, and the growth of cod would then depend only
on other sources of nutrition given by the expression Glvo (1- ki) . See Figure 3 for a plot
of the equilibrium weights given by Equation (6) under separate and joint management4.
For a given yearc1ass of cod the number of individuals decreases over time due to constant
natural, and fishing mortalities, hence we have
n~~ = f(BtC~I)'
(7) nCO + hCO -: sconcoa,t a,t - a-l,t-l' for o -: a -: A, t:; O
co h co -: co ( co CO) co.
nA,i + A,t - S nA,t-1 + nA-I,t-l' na,o given.
where f(BtC~I) = XBic~1 is the Beverton-Holt recruitment function5;
1 + yB coi-I
BtC~1 = L p a W~~_I na,t-I represents spawning biomass in weight; Pa is the proportion of
a
4 Note that equation (6) enters the profit function of the cod owner.
5 Here, recruitment refers to the number of age zero fish that enter the habitat in each fishing period.
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mature fish of age a; X 6 and 'Y are constant biological parameters; sCo is constant survival
rate of cod, n~~t represents the post-catch number of age group a cod in fishing period t.
The harvest of age group a cod in fishing period t, is given by
(8) hCO = qCOnCO eCoa,t a ait t
where e;o is the fishing effort exerted on cod; and q~O stands for the age dependent
catehability coefficient of the cod harvesting vessels.
Notice that in contrast to Eide and Flaaten (1992), where constant recruitment is assumed
for cod, we specify a recruitment function for cod and assume constant recruitment for
capelin, mainly because capelin is a pelagic speeies, for which specifying a recruitment
function is not an easy task?
Economics
Non-cooperative (separate) management
Suppose there are two agents (i.e., the owners), each of whom harvests only his own
speeies. The fishery, hence, is organised under a cod and a capelin part, each managed by
separate and distinet authorities. Organising the fishery in this way can be justified both
because cod and capelin are exploited by different parties using completely different
technologies (trawlers for cod and purse seiners for capelin), and the fact that the fishing
grounds of the two speeies are partly different. By this supposition and the fact that it is
6 X = nO), is the number of recruits per unit weight of biomass "at zero" or the polutation leve!.
7 Moxnes (1992), however, is a study where recruitment functions are specified for both cod and capelin.
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hard to imagine any market interaction between cod and capelin, we isolate externalities
that arise only from the natural interactions between the two species (see Fiseher and
Mirman,1992).
The single period profit to the cod and capelin owners is derived from the sale of fish
harvested. These are defined as
(9)
A co co1.01
,"co. co¿ co (D ) co co co lf etIl, .= V W q n e -t a,t prey, a a,l i 1 01a=4 .
for cod, and similarly
(10)
4 ca ca1.01
nca: = vea ~ Wca qca eca _ lf ett .L a,t a t 1 01~ .
for capelin. Here, the subscripts and superscripts are as defined earlier; v denotes price per
kilogram of fish harvested; w represents weight; and lf is the unit cost of hiring a given
vessel type for one year. N otice that the single period profit to the cod owner depends on
his own effort and the stock size of both speeies. The dependenee on the capelin stock
stems from the weight of cod as this depends partly on the density of capelin. On the other
hand, the single period profit to the capelin owner depends only on his own effort, as
weight of capelin is constant in this model.
Each owner is assumed to be interested in maximising the sum of his discounted protït.
Thus the cod owner maximises
(11)
T
rrco: = ¿ 8cot n~o
t=1
11
with respect to both own effort and own stock level, subject to the stock dynamics given by
equation (7), and the obvious nonnegativity constraints. In equation (11), Ilca denotes the
discounted sUm of single period profits from cod; õca = (1 + rca t is the discount factor;
rCO :; O denotes the interest rate faced by the cod owner;
Similarly, the capelin owner maximises
T
(12) Ilca:= L8cat7r~a
t=1
with respect to own effort level, subject to the stock dynamics given by equation (5), and
the obvious nonnegativity constraints. Here, Ilca denotes the discounted sum of single
period profits from capelin; and 8ca is the discount factor of the capelin owner. Notice that
even though the stock level of capelin does not enter the profit function above, it does so in
the constraints.
Joint management
Under sole ownership, the objective is to maximise the sum of the single period discounted
profits from the two fisheries. Thus, the problem of the sole owner is to maximise
(13) Il: = rrca + Il ca
with respect to the effort levels exerted on the two species and their stock leveis, subject to
equations (5) and (7) above. In addition, it is understood that the obvious nonnegativity
constraints are satisfied. Here, Il denotes the discounted sum of single period profits from
both cod and capelin.
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Cod only fishery
The aim here is to explore questions such as, is there a relative price of cod or capelin at
which it is economically sensible to harvest only one of them? A priori, this question is
relevant only in the case of a cod only scenario. The capelin only scenario is bound to give
an inferior outcome relative to the case where both fisheries are active because of two
reasons. First, no harvesting of cod would imply heavy predation on capelin, ceteris
paribus. Second, capelin is the less valuable of the two speeies. Consequently, we refrain
from analysing a capelin only scenario.
On the equilbrium solutions identified
We set out to identify Nash non-cooperative and sole ownership equilibrium solutions for
the model outlined above. A Nash non-cooperative equilibrium in this context is a pair of
strategy profiles, t(e;J, (e;o' n;J 1, such that no player wil fin d it in his best interest to
change strategy given that his opponent keeps to his. On the other hand, an example of a
joint management equilibrium is the outcome of the maximisation of equation (13) under
the relevant conditions.
Relying on the works of Nash (1950,1951) and Rosen (1965), it is taken for granted that
Nash equilibrium solutions exist in the 2-person concave game we formulate8. In addition,
Cavazzuti and Flåm (1992) show that if along the equilbrium profie players face the same
shadow prices then the equilibrium tends to be unique.
8 Strict concavity is ensured in the objective functional of players through the way cost functions are
modelled.
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It should be noted that the solutions we compute in the non-cooperative scenario do not
subscribe fully to the customary open loop solution concept derived from control theory.
Unlike here where agents impact on their rivals stock indirectly through their choice of
effort level, in the customary open loop solutions, agents are expected to directly control
their rival's stock once the rival has cOmItted to a given profile of actions.
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Table 1. Parameter values used in the model
Biological parameters
sca = 0.81
SC" = 0.535
x = 1.5 per mil. tonnes
y = 1.0 per milL. tonnes
R'" = 4.32 milL. tonnes
E = 0.5 milL. tonnes
ß = 1.2
k, = 1.235
k2 = 0.6
ß prey = 4.467
max
Dprey = 1.5
GWao = 0.2,0.21,0.25,0.3,0.35,0.45,0.562,
0.744,0.826,1.0,1.4,1.4,1.45,1.45,1.45,1.5)
co
na,O = (0.46,0.337,0.298,0.223,0.117,0.061,
0.033,0.009, 0.009, 0.009, 0.009, 0.009,
0.009, 0.009, 0.009)
co
na,O = (500,240,163,78,38)
p" = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
eaWa = (0.012,0.018,0.021,0.022)
co
Wa,O = (0.3,0.6,1,1.4,1.83,2.26,3.27,4.27,5.78,
7.96,9.79,11.53,13.84,15.24,16.34)
Comments/source
Standard for cod
Eide & Flaaten (1992)
Chosen to give biomass of 5 mil. without fishing
cf. Digernes (1980)
Tjelmeland (1982)
ChoIce as in Moxnes (1992)
Based on data in Moxnes (1992)
Average of initial numbers (in bilions) from 1984
- 91 reported in Table 3.12 of the ICES (1992)
ChoIce based on data in IMR (1994) in bilions.
Knife-edge selectivity applied
Moxnes (1992) in kg.
ICES (1992) in kg.
Economic parameters
p'" = NOK 6.78 per kg
pC" = NOK 0.6 per kg
K'" = NOK 210 mil.
K'" = NOK 10 mil.
Interest rate = 7 %
Sumaila (1995)
Moxnes (1992)
Kjelby (1993)
Based on data in Flåm (1994)
Recommended by the Ministry of Finance,
Norway
Technological parameters
qC"=0.175
qCO = 0.068
Based on data in Moxnes (1992)
Sumaila (1994)
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Numerical results
To solve the model, we apply a numerical procedure whose mathematical formulation is
developed in Flåm (1993), and applied to solve a single speeies model in Sumaila (1995).
The detail ed problem-specific problem is given in an appendix. The parameters used for the
computations are given in Table 1 above. The data comes from a number of sources
including, the IMR (1994), ICES (1992 and 1996), Kjelby (1993), Moxnes (1992), Flåm
(1994), and Digernes (1980). Note that for the sake of scaling, a fleet size of 10 trawlers
and 10 purse seiners are used as the unit of fishing effort. The simulation commences
January 1, 1996 and runs for the next 20 years until the year 2016.
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The results
A plot of weight versus age of cod for a typical yearc1ass given by our model under joint
and separate management is given in Figure 3 above. In addition, a plot of the weight of the
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different age groups of cod reported in ICES (1996) is given on the same graph. We see
from the graph that (i) joint management produces cod with the most weight, especially for
older age groups, (ii) non-cooperation produces cod with the least weight, and (iii) current
ICES estimates of the weight of cod lies in between those for the joint and separate
management cases, which shows that the current effort at joint management of the two
species is yielding some positive results, even though short of what our model predicts.
Payoffs under the different management regimes
Table 2 below presents the payoffs to the agents under the different management regimes.
Column 2 of the Table gives the base case outcomes, while columns 3 to 5 present the
outcomes from (ceteris parzbus) sensitivity analysis. The following can be deduced from
the Table.
. From column 2, we see that, as expected the best economic result of NOK 67.19 bilion
(capelin contribution 4%) is achieved when both speeies are harvested under joint
management. On the other hand, the worst econoiic result of NOK 54.44 bilion
(capelin contribution 11 %) is obtained when the speeies are harvested under separate
management. A situation where only the cod fishery is active yields a result (NOK
65.58 bilion) better than that obtained under separate management but worse than that
under joint management.
The economIc loss stemiing from the externalities that arise due to the natural
interactions between the two species is significant, reaching upto NOK 12.75 bilion, or
about 23% of what is achievable under separate management. The higher benefits
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Table 2. Payoffs from
 cod and capelin under the different m
anagem
ent regim
es (in bilion NOK)
M
anagem
ent
B
ase case
25 % increase in price
25% increase in co 
st 
Increase (0.935 to 0.99) in Dp1
R
egim
e
cod
capelin
cod
capelin
cod
capelin
cod
64.42
84.73
64.31
59.27
64.46
JoInt
capelin
2.77
2.83
3.93
2.68
2.71
total
67.19
87.56
68.24
59.27
67.17
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cod
48.56
62.42
46.89
44.80
50.44
76.86
44.92
Separate
capelin
5.88
6.59
7.78
5.78
5.63
7.31
9.60
total
54.44
69.01
54.67
50.58
56.07
84.17
54.52
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Cod only
65.58
85.98
60.48
103.70
l D
P denotes discount factor.
1'8
accruable under joint management is due to a sensible allocation of the prey stock
between predation and harvesting: A good part of the capelin stock is not harvested in
the joint management case but rather left for the cod species to feed on. For instance, a
total of only 7.58 milion tonnes of capelin is harvested under joint management,
compare this with the 15.93 milion tonnes harvested under separate management, and
the point made here wil immediately become clear.
. An increase (decrease) in the price (harve sting cost) of cod results in an increase in the
respective payoffs from cod and capelin under both separate and joint management (see
column 3 and 5). This is because an increase (decrease) in the price (harvesting cost) of
cod results in higher fishing mortality on cod, which in turn releases more capelin for
harvesting.
. A positive change in the price of capelin leads to a decrease in the payoff to the cod
owner, and an increase in the payoff from capelin under both separate and joint
management (column 4). Such an increase in price makes it economically sensible to
harvest more capelin thereby making less capelin available for predation. The opposite
results are obtained with an increase in the harvesting cost of capelin. The interesting
point here is that under separate management, the gain in payoff by the cod owner is
higher than the loss in payoff to the capelin owner, so that overall, an increase in the
cost of harvesting capelin by 25% leads to an increase in the total payoff to the fishing
community.
. An increase in the discount factor faced by one or the other of the two fisheries leads
both to an increase in the total payoff from the resource, and the share or contribution of
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the fishery facing the increase. This happens irrespective of the management regime
under consideration. AIso, allowing only the cod fishery to be active tend to be more
plausible as the cod fishery faces relatively higher discount factor than the capelin
fishery .
Stock sizes, catehes, and predation level
· Generally, the computed outcomes confirm the results ofFischer and Mirman (1992):
From Table 3 we see that, joint management leads to a lower average annual catch of
capelin (0.38 million tonnes) and a higher average annual catch of cod (1.24 million tonnes)
compared to the separate management case at 0.8 and 0.94 million tonnes, respectively.
AIso, the average annual standing biomass of 3 and 4 year-old capelin turns out to be higher
under joint management (1.55 milion tonnes) than under separate management (0.9 milion
tonnes), while the average annual standing biomass of cod is lower under joint management
(2.23 milion tonnes) than under separate management (2.62 milion tonnes). A probable
explanation of the latter res ult is that the higher growth rate of cod implied by joint
management means that sustainable catehes of cod are achievable at a lower standing
biomass.
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Table 3. Average annual standing biomass and yield under the two management regimes
(in milion tonnes)
Management
Regime
cod capelin
stock harvest stock harvest
Joint 2.23 1.24 1.55 0.38
Separate 2.62 0.94 0.90 0.80
. Table 4 below presents the total capelin harvest and predation for increased prices, costs,
and discount factors. This Table reveals that under separate management, (i) an increase
in the price of cod or a decrease in its harvest cost, leads to an increase in the harvest of
capelin and a decrease in predation by cod; (ii) an increase in the price of capelin or a
decrease in the cost of harvesting cape lin also leads to a decrease in predation and an
increase in harvest of capelin. It can also be seen from Table 4 that an increase in the
discount factor of either fishery results in an increase in the harvest, and a decrease in the
predation of capelin. The intuition behind these results is already given under section
4.1.1.
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Table 4. Effect of changes in econom
ic param
eters on capelin harvest and predation1
M
anagem
ent
B
a
s
e
 
C
a
s
e
25%
 increase in price
25%
 increase in cost
Increase (0.935 to 0.99) in DF
R
egim
e
(million tonnes)
cod
capelin
cod
capelin
cod
capelin
H
arvest
7.58
7.73
9.10
7.48
7.34
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.......................................................................,.........................n
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Separate
H
arvest
15.93
18.97
16.90
15.17
15.48
22.37
18.14
Predation
7.45
4.81
6.87
7.96
7.65
3.12
6.35
i Table 3 and 4 do not inc1ude the cod only scenario because the purpose here is to reveal the trade-off betw
een harvest and predation in the separate and joint
m
a
n
agem
ent regim
es.
lLi,
Concluding remarks
This study shows that there wil be an economic loss if cod and capelin are exploited as if
there were no biological interaction between them. Allowing for the fact that modelling and
computations are exercises in successive approximations, this loss is computed to be nearly
25 % of what is achievable if this interaction is neglected. In the summer of 1992 and the
winter of 1993, 0.2 and 0.57 million tonnes of capelin were landed, respectively, from the
Barents Sea (IMR, 1994, Table 1.5.1). This means that a total of 0.77 million tonnes of
capelin was landed in the 1992/93 fishing year. Our model gives an average annual catch of
0.8 and 0.38 million tonnes of capelin, respectively, under non-cooperation and
cooperation: an indication that current management practice does better than what would be
achieved under non-cooperation, but c1early, it does not leave enough capelin to be "fished"
by cod, as would be necessary under cooperative management.
Two other studies (Flaaten, 1988 and Eide and Flaaten, 1992) come to similar conclusions.
This would tend to make a strong case for a severe curtailment of the capelin fishery in the
Barents Sea. We need, however, to highlight the fact that the biological models applied in
these studies do not perfectly capture the predator-prey relationships between cod and
capelin, not to mention the fact that these studies are partial in the sense that they do not
include all the important predators (seals and whales) and preys in the habitat. In addition,
this study is deterministie and thus, cannot be expected to give aperfect picture of the world
under investigation. Nevertheless, the results of this paper should give the relevant fisheries
managers some food for thought.
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APPENDIX: The algorithm
The reader is referred to Sumaila (1995) which explains how the equations below are
derived and presents a single species application of the method.
Lagrangian function under cooperation
(14)
L( co ca eCo ca co ca)=Ilco( co ca co)+Ilca( ca)n ,n, ,e,y,y n ,n ,e e
T
+L
t=1
co (f(BCO co )-YO,1 t-l - no,i
A-I
~ co ( co co co hCO )-
+ £.Ya,t s na-I,t-I - na,t - a,t
a=1
ca (Rca _ ca )-Yu nU
T
+L
t=1
ca ( ca ca ca pca)-
+Y2,t S nl,t_1 - n2,1 - 2,t
ca ( ca ca ca pca hca)-
+Y3,t S n2,t-1 - n3,t - 3,t - 3,t
co ( co co co co co h co )-
+y A,t S n A,t-I + s n A-I,t-I - n A,t - A,t ca ( ca ca ea pca hca E)-
+y 4,t S n3,t_1 - n4,t - 4,t - 4,1-
Lagrangian functions under non-cooperation, one for each owner
(15)
co (f(BCO _ nCo)-
YO,i t-I O,t
T A-I
L (CO co CO) = il 
co (co ca co) + ~ +~ co (SCOnCO _ riCO _ hCO)-
co n , e , y n , n , e £. £. Ya,t a-I,I-I a,t a,t
t=1 a=1
co ( co co co co co h co )-
+YAt s nAt-1 +s nA-it-i -nAt - Ai" ," ,  ,
ca (Rca _ nca)-YI,t I,t
(16)
T ca ( ca ca ca pea)-
Lca (nCa ,eca ,yea) = il 
ca (eca) + L +Y2,t snu_i - n2,t - 2,t
ca ( ea ca ea pca hca)-
t=1 +Y3,t S n2,t_1 - n3,t - 3,1 - 3,t
ca ( ca ca ca pca hca E)-
+Y4,i S n3,t-1 - n4,t - 4,t - 4,t-
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Cod effort adjustment under cooperation
aL(.) = 8t co (~ wCo (D ) conco _ ¡I(co eCoO.Ol)
a co coP,£ a,1 prey q a a,t 't tei a
A-I
+ ~ /0 R(sCOnCO _ nCo _ hCO)( _qCOnCO),£ a,t a-I,I-I a,1 a,t a a,t
a=1
(17) co R( co co co co co h co )( co CO)+ y A,t S nA,t-1 + s nA_I,H - nA,t - A,t -qA nA,t
4 (()ca- J(anco J+ ca a,tl:Ya,t l_co -.c.oa=3 ona,t et
Cod effort adjustment under non-cooperation
(18)
aL(.) =8t CO(~wCO(D ) conco _J/(coecoO.Ol)
a co co P ,£ a,t prey q a a,t 't tet a
A-I
~ co R( co co co hCO )( co CO)
+,£Ya,t S na-I,t-i-na,t- a,t -qana,t
a=1
co R( co co co co co h co ) ( co CO)
+ y A,t S nA,t_1 + s nA_I,t_1 - nA,t - A,t -qA nA,t
Capelin effort adjustment under cooperation and non-cooperation
aL(.) = 8t ca (~ ca ca _ ¡i(ca caO.OI)
') ca caP,£ wa qa 't etuet a
(19) ca R( ca ea ca hca pca )( ca)+ Y3,t S n2,H - n3,t - 3,t - 3,t -q3
+ Y~; R(sCan~~_l - n~~ - h%~ - P:'; - E)( _q~a)
Cod multiplier adjustment under cooperation and non-cooperation
(20)
aL(.) = -R(f(BCO _ nco )(BCO _ nCO)
a co i-I 0,1 i-I 0,1YO,t
(21)
aL(.) R( co co co hCO)( co co co hCO) \-OA
() 
co 
= - s na-I,t-I - na,t - a,t S na-I,t-I - na,t - a,t V -( a -(
a,t
(22)
aL(.) R( co co co co co hCO)( co co co co co hCO )
() 
co 
= - s nA,t-1 + s nA-1,1-1 - nA,1 - A,t S nA,t-1 + s nA-I,t-1 - nA,t - A,t
A,t
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Capelin multiplier adjustment under cooperation and non-cooperation
(23)
aL(.) = _H(Rca _nCO)(Rea _nCa)
rJca 1,1 I,t1,1
(24) aL(.) _ H( ca ca ca pca)( ca ca ea pca)--- s n -n - s n -n-rJca I,t-I 2,1 2,t I,t-I 2,1 2,t2,t
(25) aL(.) _ H( ca ca ca hca pca)( ca ca ca hca pca)--- s n -n - - s n -n - -rJca 2,1-1 3,1 3,1 3,t 2,t-1 3,t 3,t 3,t3,t
(26)
aL(.) = _H(sCanCa ea hCll pca E)( ca ca ca hca pea E)
a ca 3,1-1 - n4,t - 4,1 - 4,t - S n3,t_1 - n4,t - 4,t - 4,t-Y4,t
Cod stock adjustment under cooperation and non-cooperation
eo ()co- (.) = co H(f(BCO _nco)(lf(B;~I)
Yo,t an co Yo,t t-I O,t aneoo,t o,t
(27) - y~~H(f(BtC~I) - n~~)
eo H( co eo CO) co
+ YI,t+1 s nO,t - nl,+1 S
co ()CO-(.) = anco + co H(f(BCO _nco)(lf(B:~I)
y o,t an co an eo y o,t t-I O,t an coa,t a,1 o,t
(28) co H( co co co hCO)( 1 ~ co CO)+ Yo,t S na-I,t-I - na,i - a,t - - £.qa et
p
co H( co co co hCO) co
+ Ya+I,t+1 s na,t - na+I,t+1 - a+l,t+1 S VO-:a-:A-l
(29) co () 
CO- (.)
Yo,l aneo
A-I,t
an 
co 
+ co H(f(BCO) CO) rJ(BtCO)
aneo Yo,t+1 1 - nO,t+1 aneoA-I,t A,t
co H( co eo co hCO)( 1 co CO)
+ YA-l,t S nA-2,t-1 -nA-I,t - A-I,t - -qA-iet
eo H( co co co co co h co ) co
+ y A,t+1 S n A,t + s n A-I,t - n A,t+1 - A,I+I S
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co accO-(.)_dICO + co H(f(BCO)_nCO )dj(BtCO)
y A,t an co - an co y 0,t+1 t 0,1+1 an coA,t A,I A,t
(30) co H( co co . co co co h co ) co+ y A,t+1 S n A,t + s n A-I,t - n A,t+1 - A,t+1 S
co H( co co co co co h co ) (1 co CO)
+ y A,t S nA,t-1 + s nA-I,t-1 - nA,l - A,t - - qA et
Capelin stock adjustment under cooperation
(31) yca acca- (.) = _ycaH(Rea _nCa)I,t an ca 1,1 I,t
0,1
caH(caca ca ca)ca
+ Y2,t+1 s n,t - n2,t+1 - n2,t+1 S
(32) acea- ( ) JpeaYca . = yca H(sCanCa _ nca _ pea )(-1-~)2,t an ca 2,t I,t-I 2,1 2,t an ca~t ~
ca H( ca ca ca hca pca) ea
+ Y3,t+1 s n2,t - n3,1+1 - 3,t+1 - 3,t+1 S
(33)
:\ca- () dIcO Jpea
ca O' . __+ eaH(sCanCa _nca _pca _hca)(_I_~)
Y3,t an ca - anea Y3,1 2,t-1 3,t 3,t 3,t an ca3, 3,t 3,t
ca H( ca ea ca hca pea E) ea
+ y 4,t+1 S n3,t - n4,1+1 - 4,t+1 - 4,t+1 - S
(34) ca acca- (.) _ dIcO + ca H(sCanCa _ nca _ pca _ hca _ E)( -1- JP:,; )y 4,t an ca - an ea y 4,t 3,1-1 4,t 4,t 4,t an ca4,t 4,t 4,t
Capelin stock adjustment under non-cooperation
(35) ca acca- (.) = _ ca H(Rea _ nca)Yo,t an ca YI,t 1,1
o,t
ca H( ca ca ea ca) ca
+ Y2,t+1 s n,t - n2,t+1 - n2,t+1 S
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(36) Jcea- ( ) dpeaYca . = ca R(seanea _ nca _ pca )(-1-~)2,t an ca Y2,t I,t-I 2,t 2,t an ca2  2,t
ca R( ca ca ca hca pca) ca
+ Y3,t+l s n2,t - n3,t+1 - 3,t+1 - 3,t+1 S
(37) Jcca- ( ) dpcaYca . = ca R(sCanCa _ nca _ pca _ hca )(-1-~)3,t an ca Y3,t 2,t-1 3,t 3,1 3,t an ca3, t
ca R( ca ca ea hea pca E) ca
+ y 4,t+1 S n3,t - n4,t+1 - 4,t+1 - 4,t+1 - S
(38) ca Jcca- (.) ca R( ca ca _ nca _ pea _ hca _ E)( -1- dP4~; )y 4,t an ca = y 4,t S n3,t-1 4,1 4,1 4,t an ca4,  
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